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FROM PATCHWORK TO NETWORK:
STRATEGIES FOR INTERNATIONAL
INELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN FLUX*
PAUL EDWARD GELLER**
I.  INTRODUCTION
Laws of intellectual property define what is bought and sold on
media and technology markets, notably works, trademarks, and in-
ventions.  Laws and treaties have traditionally been made and en-
forced by nation-states operating in a patchwork of territories.  Now,
the media and technology marketplace is being globalized in digital
networks.  The law is only beginning to respond to this change.1
To analyze this process in the field of intellectual property, this
Article will consider the following questions: To start, how is the
patchwork of national laws lagging behind new networks in this field?
Next, how does the international regime of intellectual property
leave these laws in conflicts relative to the emerging global market-
place?  Further, what strategies are available to private parties for
dealing with legal uncertainties that are emerging in the short term?
Lastly, how can these strategies be coordinated in the long term?
II.  THE SHIFT FROM PATCHWORK TO NETWORK
How do the patchwork and network models apply in the field of
intellectual property?  A patchwork consists of differentiated units,
* This Article represents an expanded version of a paper delivered at the program
“Public-Private Initiatives After TRIPS,” held by the Center for Global Information Technolo-
gies, Duke University School of Law, in Brussels on July 16-19, 1997; it was first published in 31
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 553 (1998).  For their comments on prior
drafts, the author thanks Norman Alterman, Lorin Brennan, Ysolde Gendreau, Thomas Heide,
Bernt Hugenholtz, Ronald Laurie, Ejan Mackaay, David Post, J.H. Reichman, Pamela Sam-
uelson, and Alain Strowel.  Copyright © Paul Edward Geller 1998.
** B.A., Univ. of Chicago; M.A., Brandeis Univ.; Doct. 3e cycle, Univ. de Paris X; J.D.,
Univ. of Southern California (U.S.C.) Law School; Attorney, Los Angeles; Adjunct Professor,
International Intellectual Property, U.S.C. Law School.  www-bcf.usc.edu/~pgeller
1. See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, New Dynamics in International Copyright, 16 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 461 (1992) (correlating changes in international copyright with changes in
the media).
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each separated from the other by clear-cut borders in space.  A net-
work consists of individuals at terminals, each linked and interac-
tively communicating with others across space, while networks them-
selves tend to interconnect with each other globally.2  Until recently,
national laws of intellectual property, along with corresponding mar-
kets, fit within the patchwork model.  Now, media technologies are
shifting the marketplace to the network model.
Laws of intellectual property have formed a patchwork country
by country.  Treaties in the field set out minimum rights, but in flexi-
ble terms so that each right may be implemented with more or less
discretion.3 Otherwise, these treaties, starting with the Berne and
Paris Conventions, provide for national treatment, requiring each
member-state to protect foreign treaty claimants like domestic claim-
ants.  Thus, while differing from country to country, much the same
legal rules have governed most competitors in media and technology
markets within each set of borders.4  Industries have tended to group
within such borders: for example, publishers have gravitated to cen-
ters such as Paris, London, and New York.  Hard copies and products
have been marketed outward from such centers within national terri-
tories.
Now, however, markets are being globally networked.  Comput-
ers are releasing creation and production from the constraints of geo-
graphical space.  For example, they allow writers to ready text for
publishing, composers to synthesize music, and designers to shape
products, all at their desk tops.  Telecommunication media, like the
fax and the Internet, enable teams of creators from the four corners
2. See generally W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE MASS AUDIENCE 48-74
passim (1991) (emphasizing the proliferating interconnectivity of digital networks).  See, e.g.,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE UNPREDICTABLE CERTAINTY 11-22 (1996) (analyzing
relations of the Internet to other networks).
3. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, arts. 6bis-16, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Con-
vention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as last
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, arts. 4-11 passim, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
4. Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 5; Paris Convention, supra note 3, arts. 2-3.  Cf.
Hanns Ullrich, Technology Protection According to TRIPs: Principles and Problems, in FROM
GATT TO TRIPS 357, 366-369 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996) (noting
that national treatment leaves countries free to fashion laws of intellectual property pursuant to
national policies).  On rare points, countries do derogate from national treatment, lapsing into
material reciprocity, but they then only further complicate the patchwork.  See Paul Edward
Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS Dispute Settlements?,
29 INT’L L. 99, 100-01 (1995) [hereinafter Geller, TRIPS Dispute Settlements?].
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of the earth to collaborate instantaneously across cyberspace.5  The
World Wide Web opens up new interactive channels between crea-
tors and producers, on the one hand, and mass and specialized mar-
kets, on the other.  More generally, the communication of media
productions, marketing symbols, and technologies is being decen-
tralized and enriched between points of input and end-use.6
III.  HOW THE SHIFT LEAVES LAWS IN CONFLICTS
Patchwork law lags behind the networked marketplace.  It suf-
fices to focus on one basic problem to dramatize this lag: What law or
laws of intellectual property should a court choose to govern cross-
border infringement?  In the patchwork, enforcement country by
country usually stopped illicit manufacturing or pirate presses, as well
as commerce in infringing products or hard copies.  Upon suit in any
one country, the court there simply applied its own law to such prod-
ucts or copies within its jurisdiction.  But what if, today, a court ap-
plied the law of any one country to network transactions crossing
borders into other countries?7  That law could provide too much or
too little protection, and that country could become either a choke
point or a pirate haven.
For example, what law should govern transmitting raw data from
a European database via the Internet to the United States or China?
The European Union has now directed its member-states to institute
sui generis property rights in raw data compiled into databases.8  Sup-
5. See, e.g., Peggy M. Irish & Randall H. Trigg, Supporting Collaboration in Hypermedia:
Issues and Experiences, in THE SOCIETY OF TEXT: HYPERTEXT, HYPERMEDIA, AND THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF INFORMATION 90 (Edward Barrett ed., 1989) (analyzing existing
technologies); Carl Tollander, Collaborative Engines for Multiparticipant Cyberspaces, in
CYBERSPACE: FIRST STEPS 303 (Michael Benedikt ed., 1992) (anticipating future systems).
6. See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global
Computer Networks, 68 TULANE L. REV. 1, 7-24 passim, 38-46 (1993); PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 197-201, 234-36 (1994) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S
HIGHWAY]; Brian Kahin, The Internet Business and Policy Landscape, 1997 ANN. REV. INST.
FOR INFO. STUD. 47, 50-56.
7. Compare Burk, supra note 6, at 48-67 (analyzing issues raised by cross-border patent
infringement), and Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997) (critiquing extraterritorial application of laws, notably
with regard to trademark infringement), with Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright: An
Introduction § 3[1][b][ii] [hereinafter Geller, International Copyright], in 1 INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, INT-46 to INT-50 (Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nim-
mer eds., 1997) [hereinafter INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE] (proposing criteria for lo-
calizing cross-border copyright-infringing acts).
8. Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, arts.
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pose that a court considers unauthorized transmissions of raw data
from Europe as completely localized inside Europe, effectively at the
point of transmission.  Then a European law granting property rights
in the data might be chosen, at the source, to apply to the transmis-
sions worldwide and, accordingly, to those received in the United
States and China.  That choice of law might well hinder, indeed choke
off, data flow at points within the global network that policies in
these countries, among others, would still leave open.9  Suppose, in
turn, that a court localizes the infringing acts in the United States or
China, where data is received but not strongly protected.  Then, to
European eyes, pirates may find havens in these countries, from
which they might more or less freely retransmit data.10
Such conflicts of laws are potentially quite volatile.  The alterna-
tive resolutions just broached in the hypothetical data case parallel
differing approaches to choosing laws to govern the broadcasting of
works via satellite across multiple borders.11  If suits for illicit satellite
broadcasts were brought in different jurisdictions, the results could
vary, say, if one court applied the law of the transmitting country and
another the laws of receiving countries.12  Furthermore, not only do
7-11, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20, 23-27.
9. See generally J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in
Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997) (critiquing E.C. directive along with other initiatives and
presenting policy arguments against granting property rights in raw data).
10. Compare National Basketball Assoc. v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848-853 (2d Cir.
1997) (not protecting raw data at issue, but opining that raw data may be protected against
misappropriation as hot news), with Guangxi Broad. & T.V. Newspaper v. Guangxi Coal
Workers’ Newspaper, 1996 CHINA L. REP. 843 (Liuzhou Intermediate People’s Court), noted
in Guo Shoukang, China § 2[1][b], in 1 INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 7, at
CHI-16 (holding it legitimate to reprint television-program data for the same and next day, but
not necessarily for other uses).
11. See generally Geller, International Copyright, supra note 7, § 3[1][b][iii] at INT-50 to
INT-53 (providing framework of analysis and citing authorities).  Compare ROBERTO
MASTROIANNI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E DIRITTO D’AUTORE 413-25 (1997) (attempting to
reconcile the alternative approaches to resolving conflicts of laws in cases of both satellite-
relayed broadcasts and on-line dissemination), with JEAN-SYLVESTRE BERGÉ, LA PROTECTION
INTERNATIONALE ET COMMUNAUTAIRE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR: ESSAI D’UNE ANALYSE
CONFLICTUELLE 221-26, 300-01, 394-98 (1996) (considering that the alternative approaches
remain distinct and perhaps differently applicable to satellite-relay and on-line cases).
12. Compare Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of
certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broad-
casting and cable retransmission, recitals 9-15 and art. 1.2, 1993 O.J. (L 248/15) 15, 16, 18
(localizing such broadcasts in transmitting E.C. countries, subject to safeguard rules for border-
line cases), with the Directsatellitensendung case, Judgment of Nov. 30, 1989, Oberlandesgericht
(Vienna), 1990 GRUR Int. 537, 539, aff’d, Judgment of June 16, 1992, Oberster Gerichtshof
(Austria), 1992 GRUR Int. 933, translated in 24 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
665 (1993) (localizing such broadcasts in receiving country).
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laws of intellectual property vary from country to country, but so do
laws governing the ownership and transfer of such property, com-
pounding the chances that different laws might be dispositive of
similar cases of transfers of worldwide rights.13  Finally, different
courts follow different methods of resolving conflicts of laws: for ex-
ample, European courts tend to apply categorical rules often codified
in statutes and treaties, while North American courts may more eas-
ily take account of public policies in choosing laws.14  Special conflicts
analyses have been proposed to reduce such uncertainties in network
cases, but they do not necessarily compel choosing the same laws in
similar cases.15
To respond to this problem, among others, the goal of a suprana-
tional code has been contemplated in the field of intellectual prop-
erty for over a century.16  Such a code would impose sufficiently uni-
form law worldwide that courts would not have to choose between
conflicting laws on critical issues that typically arise in this field of
law.  The Berne and Paris Conventions have gradually approached
this goal by dictating minimum rights that may be implemented with
13. Compare EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (English trans. 1978) (explaining European conflicts approach to the choice of differing
rules for contractual transfers of intellectual property), with Geller, International Copyright,
supra note 7, § 6[2] at INT-210 to INT-234 (reconciling European and United States conflicts
approaches relative to copyright contracts).
14. See generally Thomas G. Guedj, The Theory of the Lois de Police, A Functional Trend
in Continental Private International Law: A Comparative Analysis with Modern American
Theories, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 661 (1991) (criticizing the collapsing of European distinctions be-
tween rules and exceptions into undifferentiated policy analysis in United States conflicts law);
Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Cyberspace: Rethinking International Copyright, 44 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 103, 104-06 (1996) [hereinafter Geller, Conflicts in Cyberspace], in
translation in the foreign-language versions of 31 UNESCO COPYRIGHT BULL. (no. 1) 3 (1997)
and in expanded forms in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 27 (P.
Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT] and 20 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 571 (1996) (distinguishing European and United States conflicts analyses relative
to network transactions).
15. Compare François Dessemontet, Internet, le droit d’auteur et le droit international
privé, 92 REV. SUISSE DE JURISPRUDENCE 285, 292 (1996) (proposing, for copyright, a formal
scheme favoring choice of most protective law, as in general tort cases), with Paul Edward
Geller, International Intellectual Property, Conflicts of Laws, and Internet Remedies, in IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HERMAN COHEN
JEHORAM 29, 30-33 (Jan J.C. Kabel & Gerard J.H.M. Mom eds., 1998) [hereinafter Geller,
Conflicts and Internet Remedies] (proposing a functional approach applying laws of the coun-
tries where remedies take effect).
16. See, e.g., WILLIAM BRIGGS, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 162 (1906)
(proposing, at the turn of the century, a “universal law of copyright . . . [in] a single code, bind-
ing throughout the world”).
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more or less variation in each member-state.17  Most recently, the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement) represents new progress, treating most branches
of intellectual property in one text applicable to most countries.18
However, the TRIPS Agreement is not yet a systematic code, but it
rather incorporates and supplements Berne and Paris provisions
piece-meal.19  The TRIPS Agreement thus still leaves patchwork law
lagging behind an increasingly networked marketplace.
IV.  TRANSITIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PRIVATE PARTIES
Hence the urgent question: What strategic options are available
during this shift from patchwork to network?  Distinguish the fol-
lowing levels of strategies: first, self-help; second, systems; and third,
enforcement.  In the transition from patchwork law, analysis at each
of these levels takes place against the receding horizon of reliable
network law.  The following strategies are being outlined precisely to
cope with this admittedly frustrating, interim perspective.
A. Self-Help Strategies
The first level is that of self-help strategies.  Most simply, land-
lords build fences around their lands to prevent trespass, or herders
brand cattle or sheep to keep rustling in check and, perhaps more
importantly, to keep their livestock from being mixed up into their
neighbors’ herds on the way to market.  Creators, innovators, and
producers can use self-help measures, such as digital fences or
brands, to manage what they originate, as well as to keep out or to
help catch infringers.20
17. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.  See generally WILHELM NORDEMANN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS LAW: COMMENTARY WITH SPECIAL
EMPHASIS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 15-19 (R. Livingston trans., 1990) (indicating pa-
rameters of Berne rights); G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 11-16 (1968) (indicating pa-
rameters of Paris rights).
18. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
19. See generally J.H. Reichman, The TRIPs Component of the GATT’s Uruguay Round:
Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 179-80 (1993) (critiquing TRIPs language
as riddled with “untried, stopgap provisions, a few serious lacunae, and lots of loopholes”).
20. See generally Ejan Mackaay, The Economics of Emergent Property Rights on the Inter-
net, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 14, at 13, 16-25 (analyzing relations between
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Media productions, marketing symbols, technologies, and data,
once digitized, can be copied perfectly and transmitted repeatedly
worldwide.  In copyright circles there is a slogan regarding self-help
measures against the resulting threat of digital piracy: the answer to
the machine is in the machine.21  That is, increasingly, new systems
are being developed to fence in and to brand packets of digitized in-
formation and, more broadly, to manage its exploitation.  Since the
state of the art is rapidly changing, it would be futile to inquire into
all possible strategies at this level.22  Consider, instead, one oversim-
plified, hypothetical example.
Suppose that an epic feature film is produced at the cost of fifty-
million dollars.  Commonly, more money is charged for access to
such films upon initial release and less as the market is saturated.  It
is then crucial to release the film subject to self-help measures that
keep it from being uncontrollably retransmitted throughout the mar-
ketplace.  The film can be encrypted, and an initial signal sent to end-
users’ terminals to trigger feedback to verify that these terminals
would only decode the film for viewing upon compliance with pro-
grammed conditions.23  At the threshold, end-users could only access
the film in decoded form on the condition that their credit-card ac-
counts be debited for viewing the film.  At the lowest price, the ter-
minal would destroy all trace of the film after displaying it once; at
higher prices, the terminal would allow specified, subsequent uses.
An interface would articulate such options among which the end-user
could choose.24
The mere fact that claimants resort to such fences does not imply
any right to stop others from jumping over them.  Such rights turn on
whether or not the law deems what lies on the other side of any given
fence to be protected, for example, as property.  It is true that differ-
ent courts have invoked diverse laws as the bases for remedies
against commercial attempts to circumvent self-help measures.25
private fences and publicly protected property rights).
21. Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine, in THE FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT, supra note 14, at 139.
22. See, e.g., INTERACTIVE MULTIMEDIA ASS’N, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE FOR CONTENT,
2 F. TECHNOLOGY-BASED INTELL. PROP. MANAGEMENT (Brian Kahin & Kate Arms eds.,
Aug. 1996) (reviewing state of the art).
23. See Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property
Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137, 139-44 (1997).
24. See id. at 144-53.
25. Compare Vidéotron Ltée. c. Industrie Microlec Produits Électroniques, Inc. [1988]
R.J.Q. 546 (Canada) (prohibiting commerce in unauthorized decoders of encrypted television
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Nonetheless, even with new treaty provisions on point, it remains un-
certain how far the law should allow such actions, in particular
against providers of devices that might facilitate circumvention of
self-help measures but that are not exclusively designed for that pur-
pose.26
B. System Strategies
The second level is that of system strategies.  Self-help measures
are nothing more than elements in larger system strategies.  Return
to the hypothetical example of the fifty-million dollar film.27  To en-
crypt, deliver, and get paid for this film in the networked market-
place, its producer needs computer-driven systems.  Such copyright-
management systems must fit into some still-larger system, now ef-
fectively the Internet, that links rights-holders, credit-card accounts,
and end-users.  Indeed, diverse hardware and software systems,
themselves programmed to run according to complex sets of rules,
converge to form the networked  marketplace.28  Because such sys-
tems tend to become entangled with legal rules, they offer strategic
options.  Consider system strategies in a multidimensional analysis.
The following distinctions can be drawn:
1. Program and legal rules.  Computer-program rules can be
distinguished from legal rules, including those which
contractually bind parties.  In the example of the film exploited
thanks to computerized systems, program rules control its actual
encryption and delivery on demand and, thus, end-users’ access
signals on basis of unfair competition), with BBC Enterprises Ltd. v. Hi-Tech Xtravision, Ltd.
[1992] R.P.C. 167 (Ch. Div.), rev’d, id. at 183-93 (Court of Appeals), reversal aff’d, id. at 194-
203 (House of Lords) (U.K.) (prohibiting such commerce on basis of copyright statute).
26. See World Intellectual Property Organization [hereinafter WIPO] Copyright Treaty,
arts. 11-12, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997); Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty,
art. 12, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/96 (Dec. 23, 1997); WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, arts. 18-19, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997); Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 19, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/97 (Dec. 23, 1997) (all as
adopted by the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva on Dec. 20, 1996).  See generally Julie E.
Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect
Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 163-71, 179-83 (1997) (critically discussing legislative and
treaty initiatives); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and Its Substitutes, The Kastenmeier Lecture, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 865 (stressing enforcement as well as policy problems).
27. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
28. See Joel Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, in
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION IN-
FRASTRUCTURE 84, 88-90 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) [hereinafter BORDERS IN
CYBERSPACE]; Kahin, supra note 6, at 48-53.
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to it.  Legal rules come into play to determine whether or not
end-users contractually accept such rules as are programmed
into these systems.
2. Service and transactional rules.  Rules will vary in the extent to
which they apply either throughout a given service or transaction
by transaction.  In the case of films delivered and enjoyed on
demand and on-line, some rules may generally apply to all films
delivered by a specific service, such as those governing participa-
tion or modes of payment.  Others may change from particular
transaction to transaction, such as the actual prices for access or
re-access to the film.  Of course, all such rules would be tailored
according to the kind of works or data to which the public gains
access.
3.  Surface and background rules.  As a matter of fact, end-users dif-
fer in their knowledge of program and legal rules in any given
system.  To analyze their varying awareness, we shall treat as
surface rules those which are relatively obvious to end-users and
as background rules those which remain obscure to them.  In the
case of the hypothetical film, most end-users would understand
the surface program rule that entering an option on a menu, or
clicking on an icon on screen, allows them to see the film, as they
would the surface legal rule that they then owe money on their
credit cards for such access.  By contrast, program rules control-
ling encryption remain background rules for most users, as do
the full set of legal rules governing the credit-card system.
These distinctions can cut across each other to varying effects.
Program rules drive copyright-management systems, such as those
controlling access to the hypothetical film.29  Depending on applicable
legal rules, a contract may arise when an end-user subscribes to an
on-line service generally or pays for access to a media production like
the film in a specific transaction.  End-users can be put on notice of
surface rules by user-interfaces that will appeal to the mass market to
the extent that they are simple and easy to operate, but it might be
necessary to resort to interfaces that articulate more complex con-
tractual rules, especially in moving to more specialized, so-called
niche markets.30  For example, a developer of specialized software, in
29. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
30. Compare Fred M. Greguras et al., Software Marketing, Licensing and Distribution in
Cyberspace, 1 CYBERSPACE L., June 1996, at 4 (describing current state of software transac-
tions on the Internet), with Stefik, supra note 23, at 145-52 (distinguishing rules for situations
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marketing to clients via the Internet, would do well to settle such
terms as specifications, upkeep after initial delivery, and payment
schedules.  To the extent that market segments, such as mass and
niche markets, are themselves networked, rules in one segment might
impact on others.  This possibility now troubles legislative initiatives
concerning electronic commerce.31
That said, it would oversimplify matters to suggest that simple
assent suffices to validate such contractual arrangements.  It is al-
ready quite common, especially in technologically complex settings,
for end-users to agree to standard-form contracts.  Whether parties
should be legally bound by contractual terms at the surface of such
transactions will depend on overriding laws and policies.32  Of course,
standardization might facilitate network transactions, but it can arise
for a host of other, possibly contingent reasons as well, among them
the anticompetitive practices of parties in dominant market posi-
tions.33  In any event, legal principles and public policies at work in
various jurisdictions and fields of law, ranging from intellectual prop-
erty to freedom of expression and antitrust, may also prove relevant
to validating, or invalidating, contract terms.34  Courts may apply such
principles or policies with erratic effects from case to case, or statu-
tory instruments may codify their effects by enumerating categori-
cally unenforceable contract terms.35
ranging from one-time use to complex re-uses of works).
31. See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing on the Global Information Infrastruc-
ture: Disharmony in Cyberspace, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 224, 235-47 passim (1995) (noting
conflicts of laws, as well as varying standards for consumer and commercial contracts, in the
electronic licensing of intellectual property).
32. Cf. W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH-CENTURY REF-
ORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 65-67, 90-103 passim (1996) (arguing that, where end-users
cannot adequately understand standard-form contracts, law-makers must review the possible
legal effects of standard forms in the light of public policies).
33. Compare W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at
92, 99 (hypothesizing that some standards take hold because of historically contingent clusters
of factors, rather than because of market-driven choices alone), with Stan J. Liebowitz & Ste-
phen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 283, 288-312 (1996) (critiquing this hypothesis, but admitting that intellectual prop-
erty can be a factor).
34. See generally J.H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools: The Outer Edge of World
Intellectual Property Law, 24 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 446, 461-67 (1993)
(explaining, in a seminal analysis, how policies favoring the free flow of information impact on
the legal validity of self-help measures, coupled with purported contracts, to control access to
digitized materials).
35. Compare Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521-28 (9th Cir.
1992) (allowing decompilation as fair use), with Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991
on the legal protection of computer programs, art. 9(1), 1991 O.J. (L 122/42) 42, 46
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There is the hope, or fear, that intellectual property will be
eclipsed by technological and contractual systems of control.  Ac-
cordingly, some cyber-prophets have announced the death of intellec-
tual property,36 but news of this death might be premature.  To start,
older media are never fully swallowed up by newer media: just as live
public performances are still attended, hard copies will continue to be
read.37  At a minimum, intellectual property will continue to play de-
fault roles that it has already developed with regard to older media,
even as these feed newer media.  Further, intellectual property would
only become superfluous within the networked marketplace if all
productions and data on-line were fully fenced in, both technologi-
cally and contractually.38  Not only are such fences not necessarily
without technical glitches or gaps, but nothing obligates right-holders
to use them to control access to materials that they input into net-
works.
For example, a poet, looking for sympathetic readers, might post
her texts on her web-site and, at the same time, indicate that certain
poems may be gratuitously retransmitted as long as they are attrib-
uted to her and not changed.39  Suppose that a popular singer adapts
one of these poems into the lyrics of a song exploited at great profit:
the poet may assert her copyright or author’s rights to obtain royal-
ties or respect for her authorship.40  Similarly, trademark and patent
or hybrid rights provide lines of defense against network exploitation
(invalidating contractual terms that purport to prohibit decompilation).
36. See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents
and Copyrights, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, also published as Selling Wine without Bottles: The
Economy of Mind on the Global Net, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 14, at 169.
37. See generally Richard Lick, LA JUSTE COMMUNICATION 28-29 (1988) (observing the
cumulation of media, not replacement of older by newer media, through history).
38. But cf. Pamela Samuelson, Copyright, Digital Data, and Fair Use in Digital Network
Environments, in THE ELECTRONIC SUPERHIGHWAY 117, 125 (Daniel Poulin, et al. eds., 1995)
(opining that copyright might still be necessary, “as a kind of deus ex machina” to justify, at
least ideologically, “the use of technological and contractual measures”).
39. Cf. NEAL BOWERS, WORDS FOR THE TAKING: THE HUNT FOR A PLAGIARIST (1997)
(telling the tale of plagiarism of poetry, albeit in print, and dramatizing how such takings vio-
late the poet’s moral interests, by presenting one’s intimate thoughts and feelings in corrupted
texts and passing them off as another’s).
40. Compare Paul Edward Geller, The Universal Electronic Archive: Issues in Interna-
tional Copyright, 25 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 54, 63-66 (1994) (stressing the
importance of the right to attribution of authorship of, and possibly of hypertext reference back
to, prior works in digital networks), with Adolf Dietz, General Report: Authenticity of Author-
ship and Work, in ALAI STUDY DAYS, AMSTERDAM, 4-8 JUNE 1996: COPYRIGHT IN CY-
BERSPACE 165, 176 (Marcel Dellebeke ed., 1997) [hereinafter ALAI: COPYRIGHT IN CY-
BERSPACE] (contemplating producers’ as well as authors’ rights to assure the authenticity of
digitized works, subject to some “balancing of interests”).
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both of marketing symbols and of technological processes and data.41
C. Enforcement Strategies
After self-help and system strategies, the next level is that of en-
forcement.  The law ultimately controls behavior by virtue of threats
of enforcement.  Most notably, pirates face civil and criminal reme-
dies, and businesses negotiate contracts with an eye toward their rela-
tive force in arbitration or court.  Civil litigation between private par-
ties has the advantage of highlighting specific strategic options
regarding enforcement in the transition from patchwork to network.42
These include selecting a court, putting pressure on points where sys-
tems converge, and attacking and defending at these points.
Think again of the hypothetical fifty-million dollar film.43  Sup-
pose that a pirate cracks the encryption system and is retransmitting
the film for profit across borders.  The rights-holder then faces an ini-
tial strategic question: In what court or courts to bring suit against the
pirate?  Indeed, confronted by conflicts of laws, European and North
American courts may well choose laws differently.44  They may also
choose whether to exercise jurisdiction and extend the territorial
scope of their orders according to quite different considerations.  In
Europe, the Brussels and Lugano Conventions may come into play,
while courts in the United States look both to common-law doctrines
such as forum non conveniens and to special concerns regarding fed-
eral jurisdiction.45
The next pair of questions are interrelated: What laws to
choose?  And what preliminary orders to request from the court?46
The film pirate has to rely on converging delivery and credit-card sys-
tems, as does the film provider, to market the film electronically and
41. See generally Torsten Bettinger, Trademark Law in Cyberspace: The Battle for Domain
Names, 28 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 508, 519-42 (1997) (analyzing signifi-
cance of trademarks, trade names, and related interests for securing Internet domain names);
Burk, supra note 6, at 28-36 (highlighting the relevance of software and process patents in net-
work contexts); Reichman, supra note 34, at 468-75 (arguing for new rights in such contexts).
42. Cf. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, arts. 41-61 passim (providing for enforcement
measures, in particular at national borders in geographical space, but not expressly in cyber-
space); Geller, TRIPS Dispute Settlements?, supra note 4, at 101-02, 106-12 (questioning
whether TRIPs decision-makers may fill such gaps).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
45. See Geller, International Copyright, supra note 7, § 6[1][a] and authorities cited
therein, at INT-201 to INT-210.
46. See Geller, Conflicts in Cyberspace, supra note 14, at 112-16; Geller, Conflicts and In-
ternet Remedies, supra note 15.
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to get paid.  One strategic option is to attack at this point of conver-
gence, say, by asking the court to so choose laws that it will order the
delivery-service provider to reprogram its system to block access to
the pirated work or the credit-card system to block payments to the
pirate pending trial.47  Distinct issues arise regarding remedies here:
On the one hand, may content providers obtain court orders compel-
ling service providers to reprogram systems to avoid infringement?48
On the other hand, may content providers make service providers li-
able to pay damages for infringement?49  Defenses are developing on
this point: services that ignore content are proving rather resistant to
damage suits.50
This legal environment is like a dense and tangled jungle.  Con-
tent providers can here spring surprise litigation attacks from forums
that they have shopped, while service providers risk being caught un-
awares on the defensive or in cross-fire between right-holders and pi-
rates.51  Depending on their varying interests, parties subject to such
attacks may ask themselves whether they are better off conforming
their conduct to the laws effective within the most protective jurisdic-
tions in the global network or within its most profitable market seg-
ments or, in the alternative, whether they can get away with taking
advantage of the lack of protective laws in data havens.52  Stray facts
can also bear on survival: for example, damages in one small country
might be tolerable, but not on a continental scale, or it might be easy
to reprogram a system to comply with an order in one case, but diffi-
47. Cf. Reebok International, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enterprises, Inc., 970 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.
1992) (freezing alleged infringer’s bank account in United States, on basis of showing of cross-
border trademark infringement from Mexico to United States).
48. Compare Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (issuing complex set of orders to stop web-site in Italy from infringing trade-
mark in the United States), with Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line, Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1382-83 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to grant preliminary injunction against bulletin-board
and network services pending the resolution of factual issues).
49. Compare Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. APRA Ltd. (Australian High Court), (1997) 38 I.P.R.
294, 146 A.L.R. 649 (holding mobile-telephone service liable for infringing copyright in music
that it relayed to parties put on hold), with Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (reasoning that bulletin-board service with relationship
to party inputting materials might be liable for infringing copyright in them, but holding that
network service merely relaying materials, absent proof of scienter, is not liable).
50. See, e.g., Scientology v. XS4ALL, Order of March 12, 1996, President District Court,
The Hague (Netherlands), reported in 1996 MEDIAFORUM B59 (declining, at initial stage, to
hold Internet providers liable for access to copyright materials placed on their servers’ websites
without their knowledge), translated in Dirk J.G. Visser, Netherlands, in ALAI: COPYRIGHT IN
CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 139.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 43-50.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
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cult in another.
In any event, as the costs and dangers of fighting increase in this
worldwide jungle of patchwork law, its denizens might start to dream
of an orderly garden of reliable network law.53  Such law might in-
clude procedures to handle claims of cross-border infringement, to
block access or payment in easily confirmed cases of piracy, and to
refer difficult cases to arbitration and, ultimately, to the courts.54
These utopian thoughts bring us to the task of coordinating the self-
seeking strategies of private parties in the light of global public poli-
cies.
V.  THE LARGER INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Patchwork law continues to serve as the default structure within
which network law will evolve in the foreseeable future.  In the inter-
stices of this patchwork structure, national laws come into play with
increasing risks of conflicts in the globally networked marketplace.55
In the systems converging to form this marketplace, computer-
program rules are proliferating, but it remains to be seen how these
may best feed into legal rules.56  The following criteria are provision-
ally ventured to help coordinate the strategies previously proposed to
cope with this transition from patchwork to network:
1. Avoid falling back into the default position of patchwork law.
Nation-states typically legislate to solve locally defined
problems.  They thus tend to overload existing legal structures
with endemically differentiated national laws.  The first criterion
is then merely cautionary, directing analysis away from old
sources of such patchwork law and toward more suitable sources
of network law.
2. Organize private-public initiatives to elaborate transnational net-
53. Compare I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace”, 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993, 1022-25 (1994) (contemplating spontaneous development of common cyber-law on
model of medieval law merchant), with Paul Frissen, The Virtual State: Postmodernisation, In-
formatisation and Public Administration, in THE GOVERNANCE OF CYBERSPACE 111, 118-20
(Brian D. Loader ed., 1997) (contemplating autonomous self-regulation of diverse communities
through networked administrations).
54. See generally Henry J. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic Network Commu-
nities, 38 VILL. L. REV. 349 (1993) (elaborating a framework for handling legal claims in cyber-
space); THOMAS DREIER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND DIGITAL EXPLOITATION OF WORKS: THE
CURRENT COPYRIGHT LANDSCAPE IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET AND MULTIMEDIA 43-44
(C. Thomas trans., 1997) (discussing cross-border jurisdiction and remedies).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 7-15.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35.
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work law.  Diverse parties, ranging from private individuals and
enterprises to public entities, including nation-states, build and
participate in network systems.  Along with end-users, ultimately
the public at large, these parties all have interests in the orderly
and reliable operation of their internationally converging sys-
tems.  The second criterion favors initiatives that bring such par-
ties together to elaborate transnational law for global networks.
3.  Formulate such law compatibly with diverse cultures.  In the
patchwork, diverging legal conceptions can cohabit on the oppo-
site sides of borders.  In digital networks, such divergences risk
being compounded as contractual and other legal rules prolifer-
ate from system to system.  The third criterion requires that,
rather than being cast in a Babel of cyber-jargons, basic princi-
ples of network law make sense across cultural lines.
The domain-name crisis illustrates these criteria.  The same
trademark may be used by different parties in different places or on
different goods.  Each domain name is used on the World Wide Web
across territorial lines as a unique address.  The first criterion, just
listed above, was only partially satisfied in the initial cases involving
domain names.  In these cases, trademark owners invoked patchwork
national laws to challenge domain names that were similar to their
marks.57  In line with the second criterion, initiatives are now seeking
to increase the variety of higher-level domain names available inter-
nationally.  At the same time, private and public parties, including
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), are estab-
lishing procedures for resolving disputes concerning such names.58
Now, domain names often serve as trade names, which the Paris
57. See, e.g., Playboy Enter. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1036-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ordering website in Italy to stop trademark infringement in the United
States); Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1301-04 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(prohibiting domain name preemptively filed and used in conflict with trademark).  But cf.
Cavani c. Solignari, Order of Oct. 23, 1996, Tribunal of Modena (Italy), 1996 ANNUARI
ITALIANI DI DIRITTO D’AUTORE 279 (declining to impose liability for unfair competition re-
sulting from the use, on a web-site for lawyers and jurists, of a domain name similar to the trade
name of a legal journal, but enjoining any such confusing use).
58. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, NTIA Statement of Policy, June 5, 1998, Manage-
ment of Internet Names and Addresses <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/-
6_5_98dns.htm> (proposing not-for-profit corporation to coordinate new domain-name regime
and WIPO-convened process to develop a uniform approach to trademark/domain name dis-
putes in that regime); WIPO, Interim Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process,
Dec. 23, 1998, The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues
<http://wipo2.wipo.int/process/eng/processhome.html> (setting out interim recommendations).
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Convention protects along with trademarks, but without prioritizing
all these symbols.59  To satisfy the third criterion, a rule governing
relations between such symbols needs to be formulated compatibly
with laws worldwide.
Treaty provisions may well remain the best instruments for har-
monizing the relations between such symbols from country to coun-
try.60  Indeed, in the field of intellectual property generally, interna-
tional treaties, such as the Berne and Paris Conventions, have proved
effective in forestalling many, though far from all, of the conflicts to
which patchwork law is susceptible.  Admittedly, the new, transna-
tional initiatives contemplated here will not be without their own dis-
advantages and difficulties.61  Hence the question: How to build on
the strengths of the time-tested Berne-Paris regime in pursuing initia-
tives to elaborate network law?  To begin inquiry, it will prove useful
to apply the three criteria for such initiatives in another branch of in-
tellectual property, namely copyright.
A. Beyond the Default Position
The first criterion of avoiding patchwork law will encounter re-
sistances in the area of copyright.  Law-making is here pushed and
pulled by a perplexing variety of interest groups and passions.  For
example, authors haggle with producers, but both groups join in op-
posing users as diverse as broadcasters and libraries and, most re-
cently, end-users on the global network.  Further, copyright provin-
cialisms, arising out of cultural tensions, prompt groups to favor local
laws, to demonize unfamiliar foreign laws, and to attempt trans-
planting their notions worldwide.62
Such groups clashed at the Diplomatic Conference which WIPO
59. See Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 8.  See generally BODENHAUSEN, supra note
17, at 133-34 (explaining that rules protecting trade names, notably relative to trademarks, may
vary).
60. Cf. Frederick W. Mostert, Well-Known and Famous Marks: Is Harmony Possible in the
Global Village?, 86 TRADEMARK RPTR. 103 (1996) (considering treaty provisions on well-
known marks as the basis for a harmonizing approach).
61. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 61-66 (noting doctrinal tensions between sys-
tems that make harmonization difficult) and 73-78 (noting the risk of hyper-regulation of net-
works by multiple, uncoordinated law-makers).
62. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 6, at 165-72, 190-96;
BERNARD EDELMAN, LA PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 27-30, 65-69, 94-95 (1989)
(touching on such tensions from United States and French points of view, respectively).  See
generally Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some Problems of
Method, 13 U.C.L.A. PA. BASIN L.J. 199, 218-30 (1994) (proposing criteria for acceptable
transplants).
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held at the end of 1996.  The Conference then compromised on con-
troversial points in drafting the WIPO treaties.  So-called agreed
statements, along with these treaties themselves, now leave the rights
of reproduction and communication to the public open-ended and
contemplate new exceptions in digital media.63  Unfortunately, the
distinctions between such rights specifically, as well as between rights
and exceptions generally, diverge systematically at the deepest levels
from one copyright law to another.64  For example, France and Ger-
many formulate all rights broadly in terms of reproduction and com-
munication, while drawing exceptions in narrowly construed statu-
tory terms.65  By contrast, the United States enumerates these rights
with others in a closed list and exempts fair use in elastic, judicially
crafted terms.66
The new WIPO Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phono-
grams Treaty have not reconciled these very different approaches to
rights and exceptions.  Both treaties employ sufficiently vague lan-
guage on point to allow member-states some room to vary rights and
exceptions according to local predilections.67  Most critically, the right
which these treaties specifically articulate for network systems, the
right to control communication to the public, is not coupled with any
definition of the private sphere that would limit its scope.  Further-
more, under the so-called umbrella reading of this right, each country
may implement it with rights that are either broadly conceptualized
according to the Continental European approach or narrowly enu-
merated according to the Anglo-American approach, and varying
63. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Preamble, supra note 26, prmbl., arts. 8, 10; Agreed
Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 1(4), 8, 10; WIPO Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 26, prmbl., arts. 7, 10, 11, 14, 16; Agreed State-
ments Concerning the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 7, 11,
16.
64. See generally ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT: DIVERGENCES ET
CONVERGENCES 144-49, 290-91 (1993) (noting differences between Continental European and
Anglo-American legal systems in legislative and judicial techniques for determining the scope
of copyright).
65. See André Lucas, France §§ 8[1][b]-8[2], in 1 INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE,
supra note 7, at FRA-110 to FRA-123; Adolf Dietz, Germany §§ 8[1][b]-8[2], in 2 INT’L
COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 7, at GER-93 to GER-109.
66. See David Nimmer, United States §§ 8[1][b]-8[2][a], in 2 INT’L COPYRIGHT LAW &
PRACTICE, supra note 7, at USA-129 to USA-144.
67. See Mario Fabiani, The Geneva Diplomatic Conference on Copyright and the Rights of
Performers and Phonogram Producers, [1997] ENT. L. REV. 98, 102; André Lucas, Intellectual
Property and the Global Information Infrastructure, 32 UNESCO COPYRIGHT BULL. (no. 1) 3
(1998).
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overlaps with the reproduction right are possible.68  Under the new
WIPO Treaties, nation-states may thus continue to make patchwork
law in this branch of intellectual property.  What initiatives might
prepare the way for network law?
B. Transnational Initiatives
The second criterion of organizing private-public initiatives ad-
dresses needs specific to global networks.  The present analysis has
already broached some of the problems that such initiatives could
help to solve in these new media environments.  For example, one
type of initiative could standardize copyright-management systems,
both technologically and contractually, to assure their seamless use
across borders.69  As another example, consider initiatives to establish
dispute-settlement procedures that, coupled with new judicial proce-
dures, would expedite handling claims of cross-border infringement.70
Such private-public initiatives would not fit neatly within the
traditional distinctions of international law.  Private parties have usu-
ally exercised decentralized powers of choice in the marketplace,
while public authorities in centralized nation-states have ratified and
limited these powers as rights under patchwork law.  The private in-
ternational laws of such states have then normally accorded most
rights of nationals to foreign parties,71 while public international law
in treaties such as the Berne and Paris Conventions has specified
state obligations to assure such private rights in the field of intellec-
tual property.72  However, mutant rule-making creatures are now
evolving in the globally networked marketplace that no longer fit
comfortably on one side or the other of such traditional distinctions
between private rights and public laws and treaties.73  In particular,
68. See Mihàly Ficsor, The Spring 1997 Horace S. Manges Lecture: Copyright for the Digi-
tal Era: The WIPO “Internet” Treaties, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 197 (1997).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 21-29.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 54, 57-59.  Another initiative would network data-
bases in patent and trademark offices worldwide to facilitate transnational searches and exami-
nations.  See Charles Berman, Moving the patent process into the 21st century, MANAGING
INTELL. PROP., Mar. 1997, at 24. 
71. See, e.g., Huston c. Turner Entertainment, Judgment of May 28, 1991, Cass. civ. 1re
(France), 149 REV. INT’LE DR. D’AUTEUR 197 (1991), translated in 23 INT’L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 702 (1992)  (recognizing foreign author’s moral rights pursuant to do-
mestic private international law without reference to any treaty), on remand, Judgment of Dec.
19, 1994, Cour d’appel, chs. réunies (Versailles), 164 REV. INT’LE DR. D’AUTEUR  389 (1995).
72. See generally FERENC MAJOROS, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 8-10 (3d ed. 1990)
(indicating that rules governing conflicts of laws are often dictated by treaty).
73. It suffices to glance at reference works in the field to see the difficulty of characterizing
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ostensibly private enterprises can sometimes impose rules in their
network systems, as if they were public authorities, for example, by
excluding rebellious or misbehaving parties from such systems.74  Fur-
thermore, private-public initiatives have been developing the Inter-
net, and the enterprises and agencies investing in these initiatives
have serious interests in assuring the orderly operation of this global
system.75
The patchwork of jurisdictional competencies of nation-states
does not fully catch these new rule-making creatures within its grasp.
For example, it remains unclear how national courts may oversee in-
ternational domain-name registries or review arbitral decisions set-
tling disputes with regard to such names.76  More generally, diverse
pressure groups can be expected to prompt national legislatures to
elaborate public laws to regulate network commerce that affects local
consumers or business interests.  Such schemes will overlay the
patchwork of laws recognizing private rights, such as those sounding
in intellectual property, that already tend to enter into conflicts in
applying to cross-border transactions.77  Thus global networks risk
hyper-regulation as national laws, as well as international treaties,
impact in unexpected ways with such new program and contractual
rules as network enterprises and agencies propose to participants in
these new creatures in traditional terms.  See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (4th ed. 1990) (hesitating to characterize sui generis entities in gen-
eral terms of international law absent treaty terms on point, but proposing that their status only
be conditionally determined “for particular purposes”).  Cf. PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF TREATIES 33 (2d English ed. 1995) (noting the possibility of “an agreement be-
tween a State and an individual,” but doubting the application of “the legal régime of inter-
State treaties except on a very limited number of points”).
74. See, e.g., David Johnson & David Post, The Rise of Law on the Global Network, in
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 28, at 3; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace:
The Role of Intermediaries, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 28, at 164 (both indicating
the resources of network systems to enforce program and legal rules that they impose on end-
users).
75. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 22-24, 197-230 passim.  Cf. J.H.
Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for Ongoing
Public-Private Initiatives, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11 (1998) (analyzing private-public ini-
tiatives, especially regarding intellectual property).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra
note 58 (broaching antitrust and jurisdictional issues that new domain-name regime might
raise); WIPO, supra note 58 (exploring interim proposals with regard to the relations between
international arbitration and the jurisdiction of national courts over domain-name disputes).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 7-12.  Note that the laws implementing public poli-
cies, such as antitrust laws, are not necessarily subject to the same conflicts analyses as private
rights of intellectual property.  Cf. Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate
Trade, Adequate Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 153, 196 (1995) (“Antitrust is
by no means bound to take intellectual property-based territorial divisions as sacrosanct”).
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their systems.  Some commentators place their hopes in transnational
governance regimes that would at least engage traditional law-
makers and these new rule-making creatures in harmonizing dialec-
tics with each other.78  Such hopes, it will now be suggested, can be
bolstered by looking to common threads in diverse legal cultures.
C. Multicultural Compatibility
The third criterion of compatibility also corresponds to network
conditions.  In the mass market, user-interfaces are more likely to be-
come standards to the extent that they are user-friendly.79  These
same interfaces will convey to end-users the contractual terms with
which network enterprises propose to bind them.  The fact that the
shortest, simplest interfaces will tend to become the most widespread
raises problems of validating them as short-form standard contracts.80
In the global marketplace, it is submitted, such problems are best
solved compatibly with legal cultures worldwide.
It has been contended that the invisible hand of the marketplace
will favor network rules that more and more end-users accept in par-
ticipating in systems that incorporate these rules.81  At a minimum,
this argument has the merit of pointing out that some network rules
may obtain contractual force by virtue of acceptance throughout a
marketplace that transcends territorial borders.  Nonetheless, it is
unclear to what extent end-users will knowingly assent to ostensibly
contractual choices on user-friendly interfaces, for example, when en-
tering options in short menus or clicking on simple icons that do not
fully spell out underlying terms and conditions.82  It also remains
questionable under what conditions end-users may, in all legal cul-
tures, contractually waive basic rights of privacy and freedom of ex-
pression and, accordingly, of creatively reworking copyright materi-
78. See Walter S. Baer, Will the Global Infrastructure Need Transnational (or Any) Gov-
ernance, in NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVES: VISION AND POLICY
DESIGN 532, 539-48 (Brian Kahin & Ernest Wilson eds., 1997); Reidenberg, supra note 28, at
91-100.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
80. See, e.g., SLAWSON, supra note 32, at 21-31 passim (highlighting that acceptance of
contract terms without fully understanding them is often unavoidable in a technologically com-
plex society and that complex terms are often cryptically incorporated by reference in short-
form standard contracts).
81. See Johnson & Post, supra note 74, at 21-37 passim.
82. Cf. Nimmer, supra note 31, at 239-40 (asking how “humanistic” contractual doctrines
of knowing acceptance might apply to automated electronic commerce).
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als.83
Some of these difficulties can be forestalled by comparative legal
analysis.  Research can seek out principles common to most or all le-
gal cultures in the light of which standard user-interface terms might
be made interoperable worldwide.84  The drafters of the Berne and
Paris Conventions, in elaborating minimum rights of intellectual
property compatible with different legal cultures, have begun to work
out a kind of lingua franca for the field.85  Furthermore, judges ideally
characterize the facts of cross-border cases in terms “referable indif-
ferently to foreign as well as to domestic substantive law” before
making any choice between conflicting laws.86  Such terms might also
provide the keys to formulating contract-rule modules that user-
interfaces can incorporate compatibly with diverse laws.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Digital media have unleashed deep-running changes in the in-
ternational regime of intellectual property.  The patchwork of nation-
states can no longer respond, with its purely territorial laws, to net-
work imperatives of interconnectivity.  Just as paper and print once
undermined the feudal order, these media changes are dislocating
modern allocations of law-making power.87  Inevitably, hard cases will
arise at myriad interfaces, for example, between freely creative indi-
83. See generally STIG STRÖMHOLM, RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND RIGHTS OF THE PER-
SONALITY, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (1967) (surveying rights of privacy in different legal cul-
tures); IVAN CHERPILLOD, L’OBJET DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 152-71 passim (1985) (surveying ex-
ceptions in different laws allowing for creatively reworking copyright materials); Cohen, supra
note 26, at 175-187 (questioning enforceability of overbroad contractual waivers).
84. See Rudolf Schlesinger, The Common Core of Legal Systems: An Emerging Subject of
Comparative Study, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 65, 76-77 (Kurt H. Nadelmann, et al. eds., 1961) (explaining
methodology of deriving principles common to diverse legal cultures).  See, e.g., Paul Edward
Geller, Toward an Overriding Norm in Copyright: Sign Wealth, 159 REV. INT’LE DR.
D’AUTEUR 3 (1994) (elaborating a norm common to both Anglo-American and Continental
European copyright cultures, on the basis of which hard cases may be coherently resolved).
85. See Geller, International Copyright, supra note 7, § 1[2] at INT-11, § 2[3][b] at INT-39;
see also ADOLF DIETZ, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 9 (English trans.
1978) (speaking of the “more or less gentle and gradual pressure towards harmonization” exer-
cised by Berne).
86. ERNST RABEL, 1 THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 55 (2d ed. 1958).
87. See HAROLD A. INNIS, EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATIONS 5 (1950, new ed. by David
Godfry, 1986) (noting that “civilization reflects the influence of more than one medium, and . . .
the bias of one medium towards decentralization is offset by the bias of another medium to-
ward centralization”); see also Harold A. Innis, Minerva’s Owl, in THE BIAS OF COMMU-
NICATION 3, 20-32 passim (1951, new ed. 1995) (indicating roles of paper and printing in transi-
tion from feudal to modern orders).
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viduals and technologically fenced-in data, masses of end-users and
elite system-operators, and content and service providers.  Short-
term strategies, useful to private parties in such cases, have here
served as starting points for elaborating longer-term, law-making
methodologies.
